Preserving privacy enables "co-existence equilibrium" of competitive
  diffusion in social networks by Zhao, Jun & Zhang, Junshan
1Preserving privacy enables “co-existence equilibrium”
of competitive diffusion in social networks
Jun Zhao, Member, IEEE, and Junshan Zhang, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—With the advent of social media, different companies
often promote competing products simultaneously for word-of-
mouth diffusion and adoption by users in social networks. For
such scenarios of competitive diffusion, prior studies show that the
weaker product will soon become extinct (i.e., “winner takes all”).
It is intriguing to observe that in practice, however, competing
products, such as iPhone and Android phone, often co-exist in
the market. This discrepancy may result from many factors such
as the phenomenon that a user in the real world may not spread
its use of a product due to dissatisfaction of the product or
privacy protection. In this paper, we incorporate users’ privacy
for spreading behavior into competitive diffusion of two products
and develop a problem formulation for privacy-aware competitive
diffusion. Then we prove that privacy-preserving mechanisms
can enable a “co-existence equilibrium” (i.e., two competing
products co-exist in the equilibrium) in competitive diffusion
over social networks. In addition to the rigorous analysis, we
also demonstrate our results with experiments over real network
topologies.
Index Terms—Competitive diffusion, privacy, social networks,
equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of social media has generated tremendous in-
terest in ways that companies use social networks to maxi-
mize product adoption by consumers [1]–[3]. One particular
method of product promotion is viral marketing via word-of-
mouth effects [4]. In word-of-mouth marketing applications,
given users’ limited attention span [5], different companies
often promote competing products simultaneously in a social
network using diffusion; i.e., there is a process of competitive
diffusion on the social network [6]. For example, Apple may
try to promote its new iPhone, while Samsung tries to advertise
its new Galaxy phone.
Recently, it has garnered much interest to study how com-
peting products spread in a social network [1], [3], [7]–[10]. In
the diffusion of a pair of competing products, one significant
result by Prakash et al. [8] shows that “winner takes all”, or,
more accurately, the weaker product will soon become extinct.
A similar result is also given by Wei et al. [3]. The studies
[3], [8] provide an insightful understanding of how competing
products propagate among users via social networks. It is
intriguing to observe that in practice, however, competing
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Fig. 1. Global search-interests in iPhone and Android over the past 5 years,
generated from Google Trends2. Numbers represent search interest relative to
the highest point on the chart. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the
term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular.
products often co-exist in the market. For example, iPhone
and Android phones both have a large number of users1.
Figure 1, generated from Google Trends2, shows the time
evolution of worldwide search-interests in iPhone and Android
over the past 5 years. It is clear from the plot that interests
in iPhone and Android co-exist in the market. We remark that
this co-existence is the result of many real-world factors (e.g.,
companies can advertise the products directly to customers), so
its analysis can be complex. Yet, the purpose of this example
is to simply provide an intuitive understanding for the co-
existence of competing products in the real world.
The “winner-takes-all” result by [3], [8] assumes that each
user after adopting a product will positively spread the product
to her social friends. In contrast, competing products co-exist
in the real world, and one may attribute this co-existence
to the fact that a consumer using a product currently may
be dissatisfied with the product and thus be unwilling to
spread the product to her friends. In fact, the user may even
spread negative belief about the product that she is using [11].
Further, this can be understood from a privacy perspective:
a user may hesitate to disclose her product adoption due to
privacy concerns so she may choose to not spread her product
or even choose to spread the competing product with some
probability. We now provide a simple example for illustration.
Consider a couple’s use of smart phones. The wife holds
an iPhone, while the husband uses an Android phone. The
husband feels disappointed about his Android phone, and is
told by the wife that she is happy with her iPhone. Hence, even
when the husband still carries his Android phone for some
1https://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx
2https://www.google.com/trends/explore?q=iphone,android
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2time and is not an iPhone user himself, he may recommend
iPhone to his colleagues at work given the good experience
of his wife. We can understand the husband’s behavior from
a privacy viewpoint: the husband would like to hide his use
of an Android phone3 and thus recommend iPhone instead of
Android to his colleagues.
Our model, building on the notion of privacy, is broad
enough to represent the fact that a user may not spread
her product adoption (even when the underlying reason is
not because of privacy concern, but due to frustration of
her product). Furthermore, users today are indeed concerned
about privacy, especially for social networking where massive
amounts of personal data are generated and prone to adversar-
ial attacks [8], [12].
Motivated to formally show that competing products can co-
exist in the network, we consider the problem of privacy-aware
competitive diffusion, where two products compete for adop-
tion by users located in a social network. Individual users are
privacy-aware in the sense that an individual using a product
may pretend adopting another product and spread the latter
product to her social friends.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We formulate a problem called privacy-aware competi-
tive diffusion, where products compete for adoption by
privacy-aware users in a social network.
• We show that incorporating privacy into competitive dif-
fusion can enable the co-existence of competing products
(specifically, the probability of any user adopting any prod-
uct is non-zero in the equilibrium), while it is known that
traditional (privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion exhibits
the “winner-takes-all” phenomenon.
To provide more formal understanding, we present model
details and main results below.
Models for privacy-aware competitive diffusion.
We consider the diffusion model of
Susceptible-Infected1-Infected2-Susceptible (i.e., SI1I2S),
which extends the widely studied “flu-like” Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (i.e., SIS) model from one product to
the case of two competing products, so that each user in a
social network can be in one of the following three states:
Susceptible (healthy), I1 (using product 1), or I2 (using
product 2). Let σ1 (resp., σ2) denote the spreading strength
(i.e., the infection rate divided by the healing rate) of product
1 (resp., product 2); more details can be found in Section
III-A on Page 4 later. A user’s private data indicates which
product she is using. To protect user’s privacy, we consider:
• for j ∈ {1, 2}, each user adopting product j spreads product
1 to its friends with probability rj1, spreads product 2 to
its friends with probability rj2, and does not spread any
product with probability 1− rj1 − rj2;
• each user not yet adopting any product does not advocate
any product.
The above model is in the same spirit as the randomized
response technique [13] that was introduced to protect users’
3The privacy concern here could happen owing to various reasons such
as financial interests; for example, the husband may be doing some business
with Apple so he would like to hide his use of an Android phone.
privacy during survey interviews. We represent the privacy
parameters by a matrix
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
, and refer
to this matrix as the privacy scheme. Note that we always
require each r•• in the matrix to be strictly positive, whereas
1 − rj1 − rj2 can take 0 or be greater than 0. Formally, we
always enforce 0 < r11 < 1, 0 < r12 < 1,0 < r21 < 1, 0 < r22 < 1,
r11 + r12 ≤ 1, r21 + r22 ≤ 1.
 (1)
A privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
is perfect if
r11 = r21 and r12 = r22 (i.e., the first row and the second
row of the matrix are exactly the same). The intuition is that a
user’s private state, corresponding to adopting which product,
is completely hidden from her spreading behavior. In a perfect
privacy scheme, we write the same-valued r11 and r21 as γ1,
and write the same-valued r12 and r22 as γ2 so that the privacy
scheme becomes
[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
and the condition
(1) becomes{
0 < γ1 < 1, 0 < γ2 < 1, γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1.
}
. (2)
We always enforce (2) for a perfect privacy scheme.
Main results. We summarize the main results as ¬ and
­ below, and provide more details later. We emphasize that
all results are for undirected social networks and the SI1I2S
model described above. The conclusions can be different for
other models.
¬ For a connected social network with an arbitrary
topology, there exist perfect privacy schemes[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
satisfying (2) to enable a
co-existence equilibrium of two competing products.
­ For a social network with a complete graph4
topology, there exist general privacy schemes[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
satisfying (1) to enable
a co-existence equilibrium of two competing products.
Comparing ¬ and ­ above, we see that ¬ considers a more
general network topology while requiring a more restrictive
privacy scheme, whereas ­ considers a more general privacy
scheme at the sacrifice of a more restrictive network topology.
Below we explain ¬ and ­, respectively.
Further remarks on Result ¬. We can formally state the
above result ¬ as follows. For a connected social network with
an arbitrary topology, let λ be the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix. Then ¬ means that under a privacy scheme[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
satisfying (2), if
σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1/λ, (3)
the system will reach a stable equilibrium where both products
co-exist. More specifically, in this equilibrium, the probability
of any user adopting any product is positive. In contrast, if the
4A complete graph is an undirected graph in which any two nodes have an
edge in between.
3sign “>” in the condition (3) is replaced by “<”, the system
will reach a stable equilibrium where both products die out.
Further remarks on Result ­. We now explain the above
result ­. Result ­ applies to general privacy schemes and
hence overcomes the limitation of ¬ which requires privacy
schemes to be perfect. However, Result ­ is only for complete
graph topologies, while ¬ addresses arbitrary topologies.
Formally, we have the following for result ­: for a social
network of n nodes with a complete graph topology, under a
privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
, if
1
2
[
σ1r11 + σ2r22
+
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
]
>
1
n− 1 , (4)
then the system will reach a stable co-existence equilibrium;
if the sign “>” in the condition (4) is replaced by “<”, the
system will reach a stable equilibrium where both products
die out. Compared with 1/λ on the right hand side of (3), the
right hand side of (4) is 1n−1 since the largest eigenvalue of
the adjacency matrix for a complete graph of n nodes is n−1,
as explained in Footnote 5 later on Page 6.
Note that the above results all involve the largest eigenvalue
of the adjacency matrix of the underlying social network. This
comes from the eigenvalue-based approach of analyzing stable
equilibria of dynamical systems discussed below.
Technical approach. We use the standard approach of
analyzing stable equilibria of dynamical systems [14] (Never-
theless, the analysis is still challenging as discussed in the next
paragraph). With x denoting the state vector which contains
the probability of each user adopting each product, we have
a dynamical system comprising differential equations in the
form of
.
x = G(x,α), where
.
x is the derivative of x (with
respect to the time t), and α is the parameter vector. Then the
equilibria are defined to have a zero derivative and thus are
obtained by solving G(x,α) = 0. Afterwards, an equilibrium
x∗ is stable if each eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix at x∗
has a strictly negative real part, where the Jacobian matrix is
an m × m matrix with the element in the ith row and jth
column being ∂
.
xi
∂xj
, if the state vector x has m dimensions:
x1, x2, . . . , xm (i.e., x = [x1, x2, . . . , xm]). Finally, if the goal
is to show that the system will reach a stable equilibrium where
both products co-exist, we prove that there is only one stable
equilibrium and this equilibrium gives a state vector whose
elements are all strictly positive. If the goal is to show that the
system will reach a stable equilibrium where both products die
out, we prove that there is only one stable equilibrium and this
equilibrium gives a state vector whose elements are all zero.
Challenge. Although the above approach is standard, the
analysis is nontrivial. One main difficulty lies in analyzing
the Jacobian matrix and its eigenvalues to show the stability
of an equilibrium. In our privacy-aware competitive diffusion
problem, the Jacobian matrix has many non-zero elements,
making it difficult to evaluate its eigenvalues. In our setting
with arbitrary network topologies, dealing with the 2n × 2n
Jacobian matrix further complicates the analysis. In prior
privacy-oblivious competitive diffusion studies, the Jacobian
matrix has many zero elements and is much easier to tackle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
surveys related work. Then we present the system model in
Section III, and the main results in Section IV. Afterwards,
we provide in Section V experiments to confirm the analytical
results. In Sections VI, we discuss the proof ideas for estab-
lishing the main results. We conclude the paper in Section VII.
Many technical details are given in the appendices.
II. RELATED WORK
Single-meme diffusion. Numerous studies have addressed
single-meme diffusion, where the notion of meme is a generic
term for the information propagating on the network. For the
diffusion model of “flu-like” Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(i.e., SIS), Wang et al. [15] presented an approximate analysis
and showed that the epidemic threshold in a network equals the
reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the network’s adjacency
matrix. This result was formally proved by Van Mieghem et
al. [16]. Van Mieghem [17] further derived the expression for
the steady-state fraction of infected nodes. We refer interested
readers to a survey [18] for more related work on single-meme
diffusion.
Competitive diffusion. Prakash et al. [8] studied the
Susceptible-Infected1-Infected2-Susceptible (i.e., SI1I2S) dif-
fusion problem for a pair of competing products and show
that “winner takes all” (more accurately, the weaker prod-
uct will soon become extinct). Wei et al. [3] observed an
analogous result in the setting where two products propagate
on two different networks defined on the same set of users.
Fazeli et al. [1] considered two companies competing to maxi-
mize the consumption of their products by users which decide
consumption based on best response dynamics. The goal of [1]
was to investigate whether a firm with a limited budget should
spend on the quality of the product or on initial seeding
in the network. Bimpikis et al. [7] also considered firms’
optimal strategies under competitive diffusion and investigated
their connections with the underlying social network structure.
Alon [19] used a game to model the competition between
many products (i.e., possibly more than two) for diffusion
on a social network, and obtained the relation between the
existence of pure Nash equilibria and the diameter of the
network. Beutel et al. [20] modified the SI1I2S model to
allow a user to be in both I1 and I2 states (note that we
use the standard SI1I2S model where a user can be in only
one state), and showed that competing products can co-exist
in the equilibrium. However, this nice work [20] had the
following limitations: 1) its theoretical result was only for a
complete graph (i.e., a full clique) although their experiments
consider more general topologies; and 2) [20] lacked a proof
to show that the equilibrium is stable (proving the stability of
an equilibrium is often much more challenging than finding
an equilibrium [8]). Compared with our work, all the above
reference [1], [3], [7], [8], [19] did not take users’ privacy into
consideration.
Few recent studies on privacy-aware diffusion. So
far, there has been only few work [21]–[23] recently on
privacy-aware diffusion. Giakkoupis et al. [21] presented a dis-
tributed algorithm for privacy-aware information diffusion in
4social networks, where each user’s privacy means her opinion
on the information and is modeled by how likely she forwards
the information (the information itself is not perturbed). If
the user favors the information, she forwards the information
with higher probability compared with the case where she
dislikes the information. Giakkoupis et al. [21] showed that
the information spreads to a constant fraction of the network
if it appeals to a constant fraction of users, and dies out if few
users likes it. Harrane et al. [22] recently used privacy-aware
diffusion to solve distributed inference problems, where pri-
vacy means that each user’s measurement is perturbed before
being propagated to its neighbors. Zhu et al. [23] considered
private link exchange over social networks, where a user’s
private information is her friend list and she obfuscates the
list before sending it to her neighbors to preserve privacy.
Different from our work here, these recent studies [21]–[23]
did not consider competition between different information in
diffusion and their privacy signals were different from our
privacy signal that captures which product the user adopts.
Notably, Krishnamurthy and Wills [24] reported a longi-
tudinal study of diffusion of users’ private data. Avgerou
and Stamatiou [25] developed a game theory framework to
show that social networks help spread privacy consciousness
to large populations. Akcora et al. [26] proposed a measure to
quantify the risk of disclosing private information in social
networks. Heatherly et al. [12] investigated how to utilize
released social networking data to infer undisclosed private
information about users. Baden et al. [27] presented an online
social network called Persona where users’ privacy can be
protected via cryptographic techniques.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In what follows, we present the system model in detail.
In Section III-A, we review traditional competitive diffusion,
where user privacy is not considered. In Section III-B, we
incorporate user privacy into competitive diffusion to introduce
the novel problem of privacy-aware competitive diffusion.
Since one may tempt to convert privacy-aware competitive
diffusion into traditional (privacy-oblivious) competitive dif-
fusion, we will elaborate on why this approach does not work
at the end of this section.
A. Traditional (Privacy-Oblivious) Competitive Diffusion
We review traditional competitive diffusion that does not
take into consideration of user privacy. In particular, we look
at the scenario where two competing products spread on a
social network according to the following diffusion model.
The diffusion model SI1I2S extends the widely studied “flu-
like” SIS model from one product to the case of two products.
Each user in the network can be in one of the following three
states: Susceptible (healthy), I1 (adopting product 1), or I2
(adopting product 2).
We now describe several parameters of the SI1I2S model.
For convenience, we still use the words “infection” and
“healing” as in the case of disease diffusion, although the
diffused information is product adoption.
Infection rates: β1 and β2. A healthy user gets infected
by her infected neighbors, and the infection rate of product
1 (resp., product 2) is denoted by β1 (resp., β2). Specifically,
an infected user transmits her adoption of product 1 (resp.,
product 2) to each of its neighbors independently at rate β1
(resp., β2). In other words, the time taken for each infected
user to spread product 1 (resp., product 2) to a neighbor is
exponentially distributed with parameter β1 (resp., β2).
Healing rates: δ1 and δ2. If a user is in state I1 (resp.,
I2), she recovers on her own with rate δ1 (resp., δ2). In other
words, the time taken for a user infected by product 1 (resp.,
product 2) to heal is exponentially distributed with parameter
δ1 (resp., δ2). After a user is healed, it can get infected by
product 1 or product 2 again.
Note that the infection rates β1 and β2, and the healing
rates δ1 and δ2 are common across all users in the network;
i.e., all rates are homogeneous with respect to users. This is an
assumption widely made in many diffusion studies [1], [3], [7],
[8], [20] to have tractable analyses. Removing this assumption
to consider the heterogeneity of the infection and healing rates
across users will be an interesting direction, yet the analysis
may become intractable.
Dividing the infection rate by the healing rate, we obtain the
spreading strengths of products 1 and 2 given by σ1
def
= β1δ1 and
σ2
def
= β2δ2 , respectively. In the network, each product competes
with the other product for healthy victims. We also assume full
mutual immunity: a user can not be infected by two products
at the same time.
B. Privacy-Aware Competitive Diffusion
We now present our model for privacy-aware competitive
diffusion. Two products compete for adoption by users in a
connected social network. A user’s private data indicates which
product she is using. Users are privacy-aware in the sense that
an user using a product may pretend adopting another product
and spread the latter product to her social friends. We thus
incorporate privacy into the above SI1I2S diffusion problem
as follows.
The technique here to preserve users’ privacy is concep-
tually similar to the randomized response technique [13],
introduced first for survey interviews. For each user adopting
product 1 (i.e., in state I1), her action has the following three
possibilities: (i) she spreads product 1 to her neighbors with
probability r11; (ii) she pretends that she is using product
2 and diffuses product 2 to her neighbors with probability
r12; (iii) she does not spread any product with probability
1− r11− r12. Similarly, for a user adopting product 2 (i.e., in
state I2), her action has the following three possibilities: (i)
she spreads product 2 to her neighbors with probability r22;
(ii) she pretends that she is using product 1 and disseminates
product 1 to her neighbors with probability r21; (iii) she does
not spread any product with probability 1− r21− r22. Finally,
for a user that has not yet adopted any product, she does not
advocate any product.
We represent the privacy parameters by a matrix[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
, and refer to this matrix as the
5privacy scheme. When r11 = 1, r12 = 0, r21 = 0,
and r22 = 1, the problem reduces to the traditional (i.e.,
privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion problem SI1I2S stud-
ied by Prakash et al. [8]. In the rest of paper, we focus
on privacy-aware competitive diffusion and thus assume that
r11, r12, r21, and r22 are strictly positive. More formally,
we always enforce the condition (1) given on Page 2; i.e.,
r11, r12, r21, r22 ∈ (0, 1) and r11 + r12 ≤ 1, r21 + r22 ≤ 1.
In the literature, a widely accepted privacy definition is the
renowned notion of differential privacy [28]–[31]. Specifically,
-differential privacy for a mechanism that provides a random-
ized answer for a query on a database means that if a single
record changes in the database, then the probability that the
same answer is given differs by at most a multiplicative factor
of e (smaller  means better privacy). In our privacy-aware
competitive diffusion problem, each user’s private signal is her
state (which is one of the three states: I1, I2, and S) and the
randomized output is the state that corresponds to the product
that she advocates. More relevant to our setting is the local
model of differential privacy [32], [33], where each individual
maintains its own data (a database of size 1) and answers only
the question about the data in a differentially private manner.
Built on the above, the privacy-preserving mechanism[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
in competitive diffusion achieves
-(local) differential privacy for  given by
 := lnmax

r11
r21
,
r21
r11
,
r12
r22
,
r22
r12
,
1− r11 − r12
1− r21 − r22 ,
1− r21 − r22
1− r11 − r12
 .
If r11 = r21 and r12 = r22, then  = 0; i.e., the scheme
has perfect privacy if the first row and the second row of the
privacy matrix are the same. In such case, user’s spreading
behavior is independent of her private state.
Problem Statement. We now state the research problem of
privacy-aware competitive diffusion. Given a connected social
network and the diffusion parameters (the infection rate β1
and the healing rate δ1 for product 1, and the infection rate
β2 and the healing rate δ2 for product 2), our goal is to
find a privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
such that
competing products co-exist in the stable equilibrium.
Answer. Our answer to the above problem is different
for different network topologies. Specifically, for a connected
social network with an arbitrary topology, we consider perfect
privacy schemes
[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
; for a social network
with a complete graph topology, we consider general privacy
schemes
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
.
Privacy-aware competitive diffusion cannot be converted
into traditional (privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion.
One may tempt to convert privacy-aware competitive diffu-
sion into traditional (privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion.
For example, one may consider a privacy-oblivious diffusion
problem SI1I2S, where product 1 has an infection rate of
β1r11 + β2r21 and a healing rate of δ1, and product 2 has
an infection rate of β1r12 + β2r22 and a healing rate of δ2,
and treat this problem as an equivalent of our privacy-aware
diffusion problem SI1I2S. This approach does not work as
explained below. In the privacy-oblivious diffusion problem,
if at some point a product dies out, then the product becomes
extinct forever and cannot be reborn again. However, in our
privacy-aware diffusion problem, even if at some point an
product is wiped out, the product may revive again, because
some users adopting the other product may pretend using this
product and spread this product to its neighbors, which can
resurrect the product.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We present the main results in this section. We present
conditions for a stable co-existence equilibrium in Section
IV-A, and conditions for no stable co-existence equilibrium in
Section IV-B. The notion of a stable co-existence equilibrium
means that competing products co-exist in a equilibrium which
is also stable (i.e., attracting), and the co-existence is in the
strong sense: the probability of any user adopting any product
is positive (i.e., greater than 0) in the stable equilibrium.
A. Conditions for a Stable Co-Existence Equilibrium
To have a stable co-existence equilibrium, we discuss in
Theorem 1 privacy schemes on a connected social network
with an arbitrary topology, and present in Theorem 2 general
privacy schemes on a social network with a complete graph
topology.
Theorem 1 (Perfect Privacy Schemes on Arbitrary Network
Topologies). Consider a connected social network with an
arbitrary topology, with λ denoting the largest eigenvalue of
the adjacency matrix. For the privacy-aware SI1I2S prob-
lem with a perfect privacy scheme
[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
satisfying γ1, γ2 ∈ (0, 1) and γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1, if
σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1/λ, (5)
then the system will reach a stable co-existence equilibrium.
Remark 1. In Remark 5 of Theorem 3 later, we will show that
if the sign “>” in the condition (5) is replaced by “<”, the
system will reach a stable equilibrium where both products
die out.
We explain the basic ideas and the corresponding challenges
to establish Theorem 1 in Section VI-B on Page 10. The proof
details are given in Appendix B-B on Page 11.
Theorem 2 (General Privacy Schemes on Com-
plete Network Topologies). Consider a social network
of n nodes with a complete graph topology. For the
privacy-aware SI1I2S problem with a general privacy scheme[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
satisfying r11, r12, r21, r22 ∈ (0, 1)
and r11 + r12 ≤ 1, r21 + r22 ≤ 1, if
1
2
[
σ1r11 + σ2r22
+
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
]
>
1
n− 1 , (6)
then the system will reach a stable co-existence equilibrium.
6Remark 2. In Theorem 3 later, we will show that if the sign
“>” in the condition (6) is replaced by “<”, the system will
reach a stable equilibrium where both products die out.
We explain the basic ideas and the corresponding challenges
to establish Theorem 2 in Section VI-B on Page 10. The proof
details are given in Appendix D of the full version [34].
Comparing Theorems 1 and 2. Although Theorem 1
considers only perfect privacy schemes, but it applies to
arbitrary network topologies. In contrast, Theorem 2 considers
general privacy schemes at the sacrifice of requiring network
topologies to be complete graphs. The special case addressed
by both Theorems 1 and 2 is perfect privacy schemes on
complete graphs. For this special case, Theorems 1 and 2 are
consistent, as explained below.
We first apply Theorem 1 to complete graphs. For a com-
plete graph of n nodes, the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency
matrix is n− 1, as explained in the footnote here5. Hence, if
we apply Theorem 1 to complete graphs, λ in the condition
(5) becomes n− 1 so that (5) becomes σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1n−1 .
We now apply Theorem 2 to perfect privacy schemes.
Under a perfect privacy scheme
[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
, we
substitute r11 = r21 = γ1 and r12 = r22 = γ2 into (6) so that
1
2
[
σ1r11 + σ2r22 +
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
]
= 12
[
σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 +
√
(σ1γ1 − σ2γ2)2 + 4σ1σ2γ2γ1
]
= σ1γ1 + σ2γ2, (7)
which converts (6) into σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1n−1 .
From the above, applying Theorem 1 (with perfect privacy
schemes) to complete graphs and applying Theorem 2 (with
complete graphs) to perfect privacy schemes give consistent
results. In addition, the case addressed by Theorem 1 but not
Theorem 2 is incomplete graphs with perfect privacy schemes,
and the case addressed by Theorem 2 but not Theorem 1 is
complete graphs with imperfect privacy schemes.
We further obtain Remark 3 from Theorem 1 by discussing
the relationships between the spreading strengths σ1, σ2 and
the threshold 1/λ. Remark 3 shows that a stable co-existence
equilibrium can be achieved under suitable privacy schemes if
at least one product’s strength is above the threshold 1/λ.
Remark 3 (Discussing the conditions of σ1 and σ2 in
Theorem 1). In Theorem 1, the conditions of σ1 and σ2 for
a stable co-existence equilibrium are given by{
σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1/λ,
0 < γ1 < 1, 0 < γ2 < 1, γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1.
}
, (8)
To have a feasible (γ1, γ2) satisfying (8), at least one of
σ1 and σ2 should be greater than 1/λ. Then we have the
following three cases.
(a) Under σ1 > 1/λ and σ2 > 1/λ, (8) is equivalent to{
0 < γ1 < 1, max
{
0, λ
−1−σ1γ1
σ2
}
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
5With In denoting the n × n identity matrix (i.e., unit matrix) and Jn
denoting the n×n matrix whose elements are all 1, then the adjacency matrix
for a complete graph of n nodes is Jn−In, and it is straightforward to check
its eigenvalues are n− 1 and 1 (of multiplicity n− 1).
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Fig. 2. The shaded area in each subfigure presents the set of (γ1, γ2)
considered in Theorem 1.
(b) Under σ1 > 1/λ ≥ σ2, (8) is equivalent to{
λ−1−σ2
σ1−σ2 < γ1 < 1, max
{
0, λ
−1−σ1γ1
σ2
}
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
(c) Under σ2 > 1/λ ≥ σ1, (8) is equivalent to{
0 < γ1 <
σ2−λ−1
σ2−σ1 ,
λ−1−σ1γ1
σ2
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
The above three cases of Remark 3 are illustrated by
Figure 2 and will be proved in Appendix B-A on Page 11.
In addition, in the scenario of σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ, which
the above three cases do not cover, we will discuss in Remark
4 after Theorem 3 later that both products always die out under
any privacy scheme.
B. Conditions for No Stable Co-Existence Equilibrium
Theorem 3. Consider a connected social network with an
arbitrary topology, with λ denoting the largest eigenvalue of
the adjacency matrix. For the privacy-aware SI1I2S problem
with a privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
, if
1
2
[
σ1r11 + σ2r22
+
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
]
<
1
λ
, (9)
the system will reach a stable equilibrium where both products
die out (more specifically, the probability of any user adopting
any product is zero in the stable equilibrium).
We explain the basic ideas and the corresponding challenges
to establish Theorem 3 in Section VI-C on Page 10. The proof
details are given in Appendix C-B on Page 15. Theorem 3
further implies Remark 4 below.
Remark 4. If σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ, any privacy scheme[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
satisfies (9). Then Theorem 3 im-
plies that if σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ, both products always
die out under any privacy scheme.
Remark 4 will be proved in Appendix C-A.
Remark 5. Given (7), we use Theorem 3 to obtain Remark 1;
i.e., under a perfect privacy scheme
[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
,
if σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 < 1/λ, the system will reach a stable
equilibrium where both products die out.
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Fig. 3. Experiments on the HumanSocial network, where “CD” is short for
competitive diffusion. In Figure 3(a) (resp., 3(b)), we consider privacy-aware
(resp., privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion, and set σ1 and σ2 both greater
than 1/λ. In Figure 3(c) (resp., 3(d)), we look at privacy-aware (resp.,
privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion and consider σ1 > 1/λ > σ2.
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Fig. 4. Experiments on the Google+ network, where “CD” is short for
competitive diffusion. In Figure 4(a) (resp., 4(b)), we consider privacy-aware
(resp., privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion under σ1 > σ2 > 1/λ. In
Figure 4(c) (resp., 4(d)), we look at privacy-aware (resp., privacy-oblivious)
competitive diffusion under σ1 > 1/λ > σ2.
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Fig. 5. Experiments on the PhysicalContact network, where “CD” is short for
competitive diffusion. In Figure 5(a) (resp., 5(b)), we consider privacy-aware
(resp., privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion under σ1 > σ2 > 1/λ. In
Figure 5(c) (resp., 5(d)), we consider privacy-aware (resp., privacy-oblivious)
competitive diffusion under σ1 > 1/λ > σ2.
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Fig. 6. Experiments of privacy-aware competitive diffusion when σ1 <
1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ (Figures 6(a) and 6(b) on the HumanSocial network,
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) on the Google+ network, Figures 6(e) and 6(f) on the
PhysicalContact network).
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Fig. 7. Experiments of privacy-aware competitive diffusion on a complete
network of 2000 nodes. In Figure 7(a) (resp., 7(b)), we consider privacy-aware
(resp., privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion, and set σ1 and σ2 both greater
than 1/λ. In Figure 7(c) (resp., 7(d)), we look at privacy-aware (resp.,
privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion and consider σ1 > 1/λ > σ2.
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Fig. 8. Experiments of privacy-aware competitive diffusion on a complete
network of 2000 nodes. We set σ1 and σ2 both smaller than 1/λ.
9V. EXPERIMENTS
To confirm our analytical results in Section IV, we perform
experiments on social networks and plot a few figures.
For a comprehensive study, we consider networks of differ-
ent scales: a small-scale social network called HumanSocial,
a large-scale physical contact network called PhysicalContact,
and a vast-scale Google+ network [35]. The HumanSocial
and PhysicalContact networks are “physical” social networks,
while the Google+ network is an online social network. The
HumanSocial network from the Koblenz Network Collection6
has 2,539 nodes and 12,969 edges, where nodes represent
students, and an edge between two nodes means that one node
is among the other node’s 5 best female friends or 5 best
male friends (we remove directions in edges of the original
network). The PhysicalContact network [36] represents a
synthetic population of the city of Portland, Oregon, USA, and
contains about 31 millions links (interactions) among about 1.6
millions nodes (people). The Google+ network [35], crawled
from July 2011 to October 2011, consists of 28,942,911 users
and 947,776,172 edges.
In Figures 3 (a)–(d), we perform experiments on the Hu-
manSocial network. The abbreviation “CD” on the top of
figures is short for competitive diffusion, and λ denotes the
largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of the network. In
Figure 3(a) (resp., 3(b)), we consider privacy-aware (resp.,
privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion, and set σ1 and σ2
both greater than 1/λ (i.e., the epidemic threshold for single-
product diffusion). In Figure 3(c) (resp., 3(d)), we look at
privacy-aware (resp., privacy-oblivious) competitive diffusion
and consider σ1 > 1/λ > σ2. For privacy-aware competitive
diffusion in Figures 3(a) and 3(c), we observe the co-existence
of products in the equilibrium where the number of adopted
users for each product is positive. For privacy-oblivious com-
petitive diffusion in Figures 3(b) and 3(d), we see that the
product with weaker strength will die out. We also note that
for the initial numbers of adopted users, we select the same
combinations across some figures and different combinations
across some other figures for a comprehensive comparison. In
Figures 4 (a)–(d) and 5 (a)–(d), we perform experiments on the
large-scale Google+ network and PhysicalContact network.
The explanations of Figures 4 (a)–(d) and 5 (a)–(d) are similar
to those of Figures 3 (a)–(d), and we do not repeat them here.
Figures 3–5 (a)–(d) support Theorem 1 and its Remark 3.
We further use Figures 6 (a)–(f) to confirm Theorem 3 and its
Remark 4, where we show that if σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ,
then no privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
induces
the co-existence of products in the equilibrium. We consider
privacy-aware competitive diffusion in all of Figures 6 (a)–
(f). Figures 6(a) and 6(b) are for the HumanSocial network;
Figures 6(c) and 6(d) are for the Google+ network; Figures
6(e) and 6(f) are for the PhysicalContact network. As we can
see, both products become extinct in Figures 6 (a)–(d). This
is in consistence with Theorem 3 and its Remark 4.
Theorem 2 considers complete graphs, so we plot Fig-
ures 7 and 8 for complete graphs. We consider the case of
6http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/moreno health
σ1 > 1/λ and σ2 > 1/λ in Figures 7 (a) and (b), consider
σ1 > 1/λ > σ2 in Figures 7 (c) and (d), and consider
σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ in Figure 8 (λ equals n − 1 for
complete graphs of n nodes, as explained in Footnote 5). For
privacy-aware competitive diffusion in Figures 7(a) and 7(c),
we observe the co-existence of products in the equilibrium
where the number of adopted users for each product is positive.
For privacy-oblivious competitive diffusion in Figures 7(b) and
7(d), the product with weaker strength will die out. Hence,
Figures 7 (a)–(d) and 8 (a)–(b) all confirm Theorem 2.
Summarizing the above, the experiments have confirmed our
theoretical results in Section IV.
VI. PROOF SKETCHES OF THEOREM 1–3
In this section, we sketch the proofs for establishing Theo-
rem 1–3 of Section IV.
A. Basic Proof Ideas
As discussed in the “Technical approach” paragraph on Page
3, the proofs consist of the following steps:
• Dynamical System. We build a dynamical system of differ-
ential equations to describe the privacy-aware competitive
diffusion problem.
• Finding Equilibria. Based on the dynamical system, we
find all possible equilibria.
• Stability of Equilibria. We analyze whether each equilib-
rium is stable (i.e., attracting).
We now elaborate the above three steps respectively.
Dynamical System. We construct a dynamical system
of differential equations to describe the privacy-aware com-
petitive diffusion problem SI1I2S with a privacy scheme[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
.
Let A be the adjacency matrix of the social network of n
users (i.e., nodes) numbered from 1 to n. Then aij denotes the
entry in the ith row and the jthe entry of A: aij = 1 if there
is a link between users i and j, and aij = 0 otherwise (we set
aii = 0 so there are no self-links). We consider undirected
networks so A is symmetric. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let pi,1
denote the probability of node i being in the I1 state (i.e.,
using product 1). Similarly, we define pi,2 as the probability
of node i being in the I2 state (i.e., using product 2), and
define si as the probability of node i being in the S state (i.e.,
healthy). Clearly, si = 1− pi,1 − pi,2.
For product 1, its spreading has two different kinds of
sources: 1) users adopting product 1 honestly spread product 1
(for each user, this happens with probability r11); and 2) users
adopting product 2 pretend using product 1 and disseminate
product 1 (for each user, this happens with probability r21).
Hence, for each user i, another user j contributes to i’s
adoption of product 1 with a rate of β1
[
aij(r11pj,1+r21pj,2)
]
,
where aij is multiplied so that the contribution is non-zero
only if j is i’s neighbor in the network, and β1 is multiplied
since it is the infection rate of product 1. Then we take a
summation for j from 1 to n and have β1
∑n
j=1
[
aij(r11pj,1+
r21pj,2)
]
(note that aij = 1 for neighboring nodes i and j,
aij = 0 for non-neighboring nodes i and j, and also aii = 0
10
so this summation essentially considers only i’s neighbors).
We further multiply this summation with si (the probability
that node i is susceptible) to obtain the rate that contributes
to the increase of pi,1 (i.e., the probability that node i adopts
product 1) over time. On the other hand, since the healing
rate of product 1 is δ1, we multiply δ1 with pi,1 to obtain
the rate that contributes to the decrease of pi,1 over time.
Given these, we finally obtain that dpi,1d t is the result of the rate
β1si
{∑n
j=1
[
aij(r11pj,1 + r21pj,2)
]}
minus the rate δ1pi,1;
i.e., we have (10b) below. Similarly, by analyzing the change
of pi,2 (i.e., the probability that node i adopts product 2) over
time, we obtain (10d) below. Hence, the dynamical system
characterizing our privacy-aware SI1I2S competitive diffusion
is given by
dpi,1
dt
(10a)
= −δ1pi,1 + β1si
{ n∑
j=1
[
aij(r11pj,1 + r21pj,2)
]}
, (10b)
dpi,2
dt
(10c)
= −δ2pi,2 + β2si
{ n∑
j=1
[
aij(r12pj,1 + r22pj,2)
]}
. (10d)
Equilibria. With the dynamical system given above, it is
straightforward to characterize possible equilibria.
At an equilibrium, dpi,1d t = 0 and
dpi,2
d t = 0 hold. Applying
these to (10b) and (10d), and recalling σ1
def
= β1/δ1 and σ2
def
=
β2/δ2, we obtain
pi,1 = σ1si
{ n∑
j=1
[
aij(r11pj,1 + r21pj,2)
]}
, (11)
and
pi,2 = σ2si
{ n∑
j=1
[
aij(r12pj,1 + r22pj,2)
]}
. (12)
To write (11) and (12) conveniently in the vector/ma-
trix form, we let P 1 (resp., P 2) be the column vec-
tor [p1,1, p2,1, . . . , pn,1]T (resp., [p1,2, p2,2, . . . , pn,2]T ), where
“T ” means “transpose”; i.e., the vector P 1 (resp., P 2)
contains the probability of each user adopting product 1
(resp., product 2). We also define S as the column vector
[s1, s2, . . . , sn]
T ; i.e., the vector S contains the probability of
each user not adopting any product.
Writing (11) and (12) in the vector/matrix form, we have
P 1 = σ1SA(r11P 1 + r21P 2), (13)
and
P 2 = σ2SA(r12P 1 + r22P 2). (14)
B. Ideas and Challenges to Establish Theorems 1 and 2
From the statements of Theorem 1 and 2 on Page 5 and
the proof ideas in Section VI-A, we will find all equilibria
and show that the system has only one stable equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, both products co-exist; namely, all elements
of P 1 and P 2 are positive (i.e., greater than 0). Compared
with finding the equilibrium points, proving the stability of
the co-existence equilibrium is more challenging here. From
stability theory, we will show that all eigenvalues of the
corresponding Jacobian matrix have negative real parts. Due to
the introduction of privacy, the dynamics for the two products
are coupled together, so the Jacobian matrix is dense in the
sense that most (or even all) entries are non-zero. This makes
it significantly challenging to analyze the Jacobian matrix’s
eigenvalues.
C. Ideas and Challenges to Establish Theorem 3
From the statement of Theorem 3, our goal is to show that
the system has only one stable equilibrium, which turns out
to be a zero equilibrium; i.e., all elements of P 1 and P 2
are zero in this equilibrium. The idea here is to connect our
equilibrium with the equilibrium of an SIS diffusion problem,
and prove the former equilibrium being zero by first showing
the latter equilibrium being zero. The challenging part is to
connect our privacy-aware SI1I2S diffusion problem with an
SIS diffusion problem, since the privacy scheme considered
in Theorem 3 is very general.
VII. CONCLUSION
In competitive diffusion where two products compete for
user adoption, prior studies show that the weaker product will
soon become extinct. However, in practice, competing prod-
ucts often co-exist in the market. We find that considering user
privacy can address this discrepancy. More specifically, we
incorporate user privacy into competitive diffusion to propose
the novel problem of privacy-aware competitive diffusion, and
formally show that privacy can enable the co-existence of
competing products.
APPENDIX A
USEFUL LEMMAS
To establish our main results, we find it useful
to present Lemmas 1–3 below. These lemmas
apply for a privacy-aware SI1I2S problem with a
privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
satisfying 0 < r11 < 1, 0 < r12 < 1,0 < r21 < 1, 0 < r22 < 1,
r11 + r12 ≤ 1, r21 + r22 ≤ 1.
. The proofs of
Lemmas 1–3 are presented in Appendix A of the online full
version [34], due to space limitation.
Lemma 1. At an equilibrium, we have si 6= 0 for any i =
1, 2, . . . , n.
Lemma 2. At an equilibrium, we have
either (i) pi,1 = 0 and pi,2 = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n such that
P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0,
or (ii) pi,1 > 0 and pi,2 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n such that
P 1 and P 2 are both positive vectors (a positive
vector means that each dimension is positive).
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Lemma 3. At an equilibrium, we have the following properties
for the matrix SA.
(i) SA is non-negative and irreducible.
(ii) SA has a unique positive real number (say λ(SA)) as
its largest eigenvalue (in magnitude). Furthermore, the
algebraic multiplicity of λ(SA) is 1, and it has a positive
eigenvector.
(iii) Except the largest eigenvalue λ(SA), no other eigenvalue
of SA has a positive eigenvector.
APPENDIX B
PROVING THEOREM 1 AND ITS REMARK 3
This section is organized as follows. We prove Remark 3
of Theorem 1 in Appendix B-A, and establish Theorem 1 in
Appendix B-B.
A. Proving Remark 3 of Theorem 1
The proof of Remark 3 is straightforward and is still
presented here for clarity. We discuss the three cases of
Remark 3.
(a) Under σ1 > 1/λ and σ2 > 1/λ, we will show that{
(i): σ1γ1 + σ2γ2 > 1/λ,
(ii): 0 < γ1 < 1, (iii): 0 < γ2 < 1, (iv): γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1.
}
(15)
is equivalent to{
(i): 0 < γ1 < 1,
(ii): max
{
0, λ
−1−σ1γ1
σ2
}
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
(16)
To see (16) =⇒ (15), we obtain (15)-(i) from γ2 >
λ−1−σ1γ1
σ2
of (16)-(ii), while the inequalities (ii) (iii) (iv)
in the second row of (15) follow clearly from (16). To see
(15) =⇒ (16), we have (16)-(i) from (15)-(ii) and obtain
(16)-(ii) from (15)-(i) (iii) (iv).
(b) Under σ1 > 1/λ ≥ σ2, we will show that (15) is equivalent
to {
(i): λ
−1−σ2
σ1−σ2 < γ1 < 1,
(ii): max
{
0, λ
−1−σ1γ1
σ2
}
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
. (17)
To see (17) =⇒ (15), we obtain (15)-(i) from γ2 >
λ−1−σ1γ1
σ2
of (17)-(ii), obtain (15)-(ii) from (17)-(i) and
the condition 1/λ ≥ σ2 here, obtain (15)-(iii) from (17)-
(ii) and the just-proved result γ1 > 0 of (15)-(ii), and
obtain (15)-(iv) from (17)-(ii). To see (15) =⇒ (17), we
obtain (17)-(i) from (15)-(i) (ii) (iv), obtain (17)-(ii) from
(15)-(i) (iii) (iv).
(c) Under σ2 > 1/λ ≥ σ1, we will show that (8) is equivalent
to {
(i): 0 < γ1 < σ2−λ
−1
σ2−σ1 ,
(ii): λ
−1−σ1γ1
σ2
< γ2 ≤ 1− γ1.
}
. (18)
To see (18) =⇒ (15), we obtain (15)-(i) from γ2 >
λ−1−σ1γ1
σ2
of (18)-(ii), obtain (15)-(ii) from (18)-(i) and
the condition 1/λ ≥ σ1 here, obtain (15)-(iii) from (18)-
(ii), the condition 1/λ ≥ σ1 here and the just-proved result
0 < γ1 < 1 of (15)-(ii), and obtain (15)-(iv) from (18)-(ii).
To see (15) =⇒ (18), we obtain (18)-(i) from (15)-(i) (ii)
(iv), obtain (18)-(ii) from (15)-(i) (iii) (iv).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We now prove Theorem 1 in detail. Specifically, based
on (10b) and (10d), we will discuss equilibrium points in
Appendix B-B1 and their stability in Appendix B-B2. Al-
though Theorem 1 considers privacy schemes in the form of[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
, we will often use a general privacy
scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
to present a general anal-
ysis, which will be useful later for proving other theorems.
1) Equilibrium points:
From Lemma 2, an equilibrium
(i) either satisfies pi,1 = 0 and pi,2 = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
such that P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0,
(ii) or satisfies pi,1 > 0 and pi,2 > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n such
that P 1 and P 2 are both positive vectors (a positive vector
means that each dimension is positive).
We further analyze the second case below.
Computing (13)× σ2r22 − (14)× σ1r21, we have
σ2r22P 1 − σ1r21P 2 = σ1σ2(r11r22 − r12r21)SAP 1. (19)
Computing (13)× σ2r12 − (14)× σ1r11, we have
σ2r12P 1 − σ1r11P 2 = σ1σ2(r12r21 − r11r22)SAP 2. (20)
Under r11r22 = r12r21 (which clearly holds given r11 =
r21 = γ1 and r12 = r22 = γ2 for the privacy scheme[
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
γ1 γ2 1− γ1 − γ2
]
considered in Theorem 1 here), we
obtain from (19) (resp., (20)) that
P 1 =
σ1r21
σ2r22
P 2 (resp., P 1 = σ1r11σ2r12P 2). (21)
The above two results P 1 = σ1r21σ2r22P 2 and P 1 =
σ1r11
σ2r12
P 2 are
the same given r11r22 = r12r21. Substituting P 1 = σ1r21σ2r22P 2
into (13), we obtain
P ` = (σ1r11 + σ2r22)SAP `, for ` = 1, 2. (22)
With Q denoting P 1 + P 2, (22) implies
Q = (σ1r11 + σ2r22)SAQ. (23)
From (23), as will be clear soon, it is useful to look at a
traditional privacy-oblivious SIS diffusion problem (not our
privacy-aware SI1I2S competitive diffusion problem, yet still
on the network with adjacency matrix A) with infection rate
β∗ and healing rate δ∗ satisfying
β∗/δ∗ = σ1r11 + σ2r22. (24)
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with qi denoting the probability of node i
being infected in the above SIS diffusion problem, it is well-
known that the dynamical system characterizing SIS diffusion
is given by
dqi
dt
= −δ∗qi + β∗(1− qi)
n∑
j=1
(aijqj). (25)
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Below we explain (25) for the above SIS diffusion problem.
For each user i, another user j contributes to i’s infection
with a rate of β∗aijqj , where aij is multiplied so that the
contribution is non-zero only if j is i’s neighbor in the
network, and β∗ is multiplied since it is the infection rate.
Then we take a summation for j from 1 to n and have
β∗
∑n
j=1(aijqj) (note that aij = 1 for neighboring nodes
i and j, aij = 0 for non-neighboring nodes i and j, and
also aii = 0 so this summation essentially considers only i’s
neighbors). We further multiply this summation with 1 − qi
(the probability that node i is susceptible) to obtain the rate
that contributes to the increase of qi over time. On the other
hand, since the healing rate is δ∗, we multiply δ∗ with qi
to obtain the rate that contributes to the decrease of qi over
time. Given these, we obtain that dqid t is the result of the rate
β∗(1−qi)
∑n
j=1(aijqj) minus the rate δ∗qi; i.e., we have (25).
In the above SIS problem, at an equilibrium, (24) (25) and
dqi
d t = 0 together imply
qi = (σ1r11 + σ2r22)(1− qi)
n∑
j=1
(aijqj). (26)
We recall (23), where Q is a column vector with elements
pi,1 + pi,2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and S is a diagonal matrix
with elements 1 − (pi,1 + pi,2) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This and
(26) together mean that pi,1 + pi,2 can be understood as qi
in (26) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n so that Q is an equilibrium of the
above SIS problem. As shown in prior work [15]–[17], with
λ denoting the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A,
for the above SIS problem, on the one hand, if β∗/δ∗ < 1/λ,
the only equilibrium is Q = 0, which implies P 1 = 0 and
P 2 = 0 from Q = P 1+P 2 and P 1 = σ1r21σ2r22P 2; on the other
hand, if
β∗/δ∗ > 1/λ, (27)
an equilibrium of positive Q exists and can be determined by
A and β∗/δ∗. We denote this equilibrium by V SIS(A, β∗/δ∗).
Then if
σ1r11 + σ2r22 > 1/λ (28)
which holds from (24) and (27), we use P 1 = σ1r21σ2r22P 2, Q =
P 1 +P 2, and Q = V SIS(A, β∗/δ∗) to obtain an equilibrium
of positive vectors P 1 and P 2:
P 1 =
σ1r21
σ1r21 + σ2r22
· V SIS(A, β∗/δ∗), (29)
P 2 =
σ2r22
σ1r21 + σ2r22
· V SIS(A, β∗/δ∗). (30)
To summarize, under r11 = r21 = γ1, r12 = r22 = γ2 and
(28), we have the following.
• An equilibrium of positive P 1 and P 2 is given by (29)
and (30). In Appendix B-B2 below, we will show that this
equilibrium is stable under (28).
• Another equilibrium is the zero equilibrium: P 1 = 0 and
P 2 = 0. In Appendix B-B3 below, we will show that this
equilibrium is unstable under (28).
2) Stability of the equilibrium given by (29) and (30):
To prove Theorem 1, we will show that the equilibrium of
positive P 1 and P 2 given by (29) and (30) is stable given
r11 = r21, r12 = r22, and (28). To this end, we will derive
the Jacobian matrix based on (11) and (12), and prove that all
of its eigenvalues have negative real parts.
The Jacobian matrix has four parts
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
, where each
Jab for row index a = 1, 2 and column index b = 1, 2 is
an n × n matrix comprising 1∂pj,b ∂
dpi,a
d t for row index i =
1, 2, . . . , n and column index j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In other words,
• 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,1
d t is in the ith row and jth column of J11;
• 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,1
d t is in the ith row and jth column of J12;
• 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,2
d t is in the ith row and jth column of J21;
• 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,2
d t is in the ith row and jth column of J22.
To compute the matrix J11 which contains 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,1
d t for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, from (10b) and si =
1− pi,1 − pi,2, we obtain
1
∂pi,1
∂
dpi,1
dt
= −δ1 + β1r11 · siaii
− β1
[
r11
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,1) + r21
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,2)
]
, (31)
and for j 6= i,
1
∂pj,1
∂
dpi,1
dt
= β1r11 · siaij . (32)
To express J11 using (31) and (32), we now introduce some
notation. Let I be the n × n unit matrix. We define an
n × n diagonal matrix diag(AP 1) as follows: if AP 1 =
[w1, w2, . . . , wn]
T , then diag(AP 1) is the diagonal matrix
with elements w1, w2, . . . , wn (from the upper left to the lower
right). Similarly, we also define an n × n diagonal matrix
diag(AP 2). With the above notation, we use (31) and (32) to
express the matrix J11 comprising 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,1
d t for row index
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and column index j = 1, 2, . . . , n as follows:
J11 =− δ1I + β1r11SA
− β1r11diag(AP 1)− β1r21diag(AP 2). (33)
To compute the matrix J12 which contains 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,1
d t for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, from (10b) and si =
1− pi,1 − pi,2, we obtain
1
∂pi,2
∂
dpi,1
dt
= β1r21 · siaii − β1
[
r11
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,1) + r21
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,2)
]
,
(34)
and for j 6= i,
1
∂pj,2
∂
dpi,1
dt
= β1r21 · siaij . (35)
Combining (34) and (35), we express the matrix J12 com-
prising 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,1
d t for row index i = 1, 2, . . . , n and column
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index j = 1, 2, . . . , n as follows:
J12 = β1r21SA− β1r11diag(AP 1)− β1r21diag(AP 2).
(36)
To compute the matrix J21 which contains 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,2
d t for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, from (10d) and si =
1− pi,1 − pi,2, we obtain
1
∂pi,1
∂
dpi,2
dt
= β2r12 · siaii − β2
[
r12
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,1) + r22
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,2)
]
,
(37)
and for j 6= i,
1
∂pj,1
∂
dpi,2
dt
= β2r12 · siaij . (38)
Combining (37) and (38), we express the matrix J21 com-
prising 1∂pj,1 ∂
dpi,2
d t for row index i = 1, 2, . . . , n and column
index j = 1, 2, . . . , n as follows:
J21 = β2r12SA− β2r12diag(AP 1)− β2r22diag(AP 2).
(39)
To compute the matrix J22 which contains 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,2
d t for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, from (10d) and si =
1− pi,1 − pi,2, we obtain
1
∂pi,2
∂
dpi,2
dt
= −δ2 + β2r22 · siaii
− β2
[
r12
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,1) + r22
n∑
j=1
(aijpj,2)
]
, (40)
and for j 6= i,
1
∂pj,2
∂
dpi,2
dt
= β2r22 · siaij . (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we express the matrix J22 com-
prising 1∂pj,2 ∂
dpi,2
d t for row index i = 1, 2, . . . , n and column
index j = 1, 2, . . . , n as follows:
J22 =− δ2I + β2r22SA
− β2r12diag(AP 1)− β2r22diag(AP 2). (42)
Our goal is to show that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
have negative real parts. By definition,
with I2n denoting the 2n×2n unit matrix, x is an eigenvalue
of
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
if
∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣ = 0, where | · |
denotes the determinant. From (33) (36) (39) (42), r11 = r21
and r12 = r22, it follows that[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
− xI2n
=

−(δ1 + x)I + β1r11SA
−β1r11diag(AP 1)
−β1r11diag(AP 2)
−β1r11diag(AP 1)
+β1r11SA
−β1r11diag(AP 2)
−β2r22diag(AP 2)
+β2r22SA
−β2r22diag(AP 1)
−(δ2 + x)I + β2r22SA
−β2r22diag(AP 2)
−β2r22diag(AP 1)

.
(43)
Without loss of generality, we assume δ1 ≤ δ2 below. In
the matrix
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
− xI2n given by (43), we add the
(`+ n)th column to `th column for ` = 1, 2, . . . , n. This does
not change the determinant of
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
− xI2n; i.e., it
holds that∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−(δ1 + x)I
−β1r11diag(AP 1)
+β1r11SA
−β1r11diag(AP 2)
(δ2 + x)I
−(δ2 + x)I + β2r22SA
−β2r22diag(AP 2)
−β2r22diag(AP 1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (44)
To prove the result that any x satisfying∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣ = 0 has a negative real part by
contradiction, we assume that there exists x with a
non-negative real part (note x could be real or imaginary).
To analyze (44), we use the following result: for n × n
matrices A, B, C and D, if A is invertible, then∣∣∣∣[A BC D
]∣∣∣∣ = |A| × |D − CA−1B|. Since x has a non-
negative real part, the matrix −(δ1+x)I is invertible. Hence,
we obtain from (44) that∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣−(δ1 + x)I∣∣×
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
 −(δ2 + x)I + β2r22SA−β2r22diag(AP 2)
−β2r22diag(AP 1)

−(δ2 + x)I × [−(δ1 + x)−1I]
×
 −β1r11diag(AP 1)+β1r11SA
−β1r11diag(AP 2)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (−1)n(δ1 + x)n×
×
∣∣∣∣ ( −δ2I + ySA−ydiag(AP 2)− ydiag(AP 1)
)
− xI
∣∣∣∣ (45)
for
y
def
= β2r22 +
δ2 + x
δ1 + x
β1r11. (46)
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Since x has a non-negative real part, we write x = a+ bi,
where i is the imaginary unit, a and b are real numbers, and a
is non-negative (if b = 0, then x is a real number). Substituting
x = a+ bi into (46), we can express y as c+ di, where
c
def
= β2r22 +
(δ1 + a)(δ2 + a) + b
2
(δ1 + a)2 + b2
· β1r11, (47)
and d def= b(δ1−δ2)(δ1+a)2+b2 · β1r11. From (45), since x
is assumed to have a non-negative real part, we have
(δ1 + x)
n 6= 0 so that
∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣ = 0 implies∣∣∣∣ ( −δ2I + ySA−ydiag(AP 2)− ydiag(AP 1)
)
− xI
∣∣∣∣ = 0; i.e., x is
an eigenvalue of D for
D
def
= −δ2I + ySA− ydiag(AP 2)− ydiag(AP 1). (48)
For any matrix M , we define λRmax as the maximum among
the real parts of the eigenvalues of M . From (48) and y =
c+ di, it holds that
λRmax(D +D
T )
= λRmax
 −2δ2I + (c+ di) · (SA+AS)−2(c+ di) · diag(AP 1)
−2(c+ di) · diag(AP 2)
 , (49)
where we use (SA)T = ATST = AS since matrices A and
S are both symmetric.
From standard linear algebra [37], if matrices X and Y
are symmetric, then λRmax(X + Y ) ≤ λRmax(X) + λRmax(Y ).
Hence, we obtain from (49) that
λRmax(D +D
T )
≤ −2δ2 + λRmax
(
(c+ di) · (SA+AS))
+ λRmax
(− 2(c+ di) · diag(AP 1))
+ λRmax
(− 2(c+ di) · diag(AP 2)). (50)
From Lemma 2, it holds that pj,1 > 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
implying that
∑n
j=1(aijpj,1) > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then diag(AP 1) is a diagonal matrix with all positive en-
tries and hence has all positive eigenvalues. This means
that λmin
(
diag(AP 1)
)
denoting the minimal eigenvalue of
diag(AP 1) is negative. With c > 0 from (47), λRmax
(− 2(c+
di) · diag(AP 1)
)
equals −2c · λmin
(
diag(AP 1)
)
and thus is
negative; i.e.
λRmax
(− 2(c+ di) · diag(AP 1)) < 0. (51)
Similar to the above analysis, we use Lemma 2 and eventually
obtain
λRmax
(− 2(c+ di) · diag(AP 2)) < 0. (52)
Since SA+AS is a symmetric and real matrix, its eigenvalues
are all real. Then
λRmax
(
(c+ di) · (SA+AS)) = cλmax(SA+AS). (53)
Then it follows from (23) that Q = (σ1r11+σ2r22)SAQ. In
addition, SA is a positive vector from Lemma 1. Combining
the above with Lemma 3, λmax(SA) denoting the largest
eigenvalue (in magnitude) of SA is given by
λmax(SA) = 1/(σ1r11 + σ2r22). (54)
From matrix theory [37], for any real non-negative matrix M ,
if λmax(M) denoting the largest eigenvalue (in magnitude)
of M is positive, then λmax(M +MT ) ≤ 2λmax(M). This
result along with (54) above induces
λmax(SA+AS) ≤ 2λmax(SA) = 2/(σ1r11 + σ2r22).
(55)
Combining (53) and (55), we have
λRmax
(
(c+ di) · (SA+AS)) ≤ 2c/(σ1r11 + σ2r22). (56)
To use (56), it is useful to bound c defined by (47). Recalling
a ≥ 0, we obtain from (47) that
c = β2r22 +
(δ1 + a)(δ2 + a) + b
2
(δ1 + a)2 + b2
· β1r11
= β2r22 + β1r11 ·
(
1 +
δ2 − δ1
δ1 + a
+
b2
(δ1 + a)2 + b2
)
≤ β2r22 + β1r11 ·
(
1 +
δ2 − δ1
δ1
)
= β2r22 +
β1r11δ2
δ1
= δ2 · (σ1r11 + σ2r22), (57)
where the last step uses β1 = δ1σ1 and β2 = δ2σ2.
Applying (51) (52) (56) and (57) to (50), we finally derive
λRmax(D + D
T ) < 0. From the Lyapunov theorem [38], it
further follows that all eigenvalues of D have negative real
parts. Hence, recalling x is an eigenvalue of D (see the
sentence containing (48)), the real part of x is negative, which
contradicts with the assumption that the real part of x is
non-negative. Then the assumption does not hold and hence
we have proved that any eigenvalue x of the Jacobian matrix[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
has negative real parts so that the equilibrium
given by (29) and (30) is stable. 
3) Instability of the equilibrium given by P 1 = 0 and
P 2 = 0 for Theorem 1:
Under P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0, which implies S = In, we
obtain from (45) that∣∣∣∣[J11 J12J21 J22
]
− xI2n
∣∣∣∣
= (−1)n(δ1 + x)n ×
∣∣ ( −δ2I + yA )− xI ∣∣ (58)
for
y
def
= β2r22 +
δ2 + x
δ1 + x
β1r11. (59)
From (58), x is an eigenvalue of
[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
if −δ2I + yA
has an eigenvalue x. Recall that λ denotes the largest eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix A. Then −δ2I + yA has an
eigenvalue −δ2I+y ·λ. Setting −δ2I+yλ = x, we substitute
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(59) into this equation and have
x2 − [(δ1 + δ2)− (β1r11 + β2r22)λ]x
+ δ1δ2 − (β1δ2r11 + β2δ1r22)λ = 0. (60)
Under the condition σ1r11 + σ2r22 > 1/λ, the constant term
in the quadratic equation (60) of x is negative given
δ1δ2 − (β1δ2r11 + β2δ1r22)λ
= δ1δ2 − δ1δ2 · (σ1r11 + σ2r22)λ < 0,
where β1 = σ1δ1 and β2 = σ2δ2 have been used. Hence, there
exists a positive real solution to (60), which further means that[
J11 J12
J21 J22
]
has a positive real eigenvalue under P 1 = 0 and
P 2 = 0. Hence, the equilibrium given by P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0
is unstable. 
APPENDIX C
PROVING THEOREM 3 AND ITS REMARK 4
A. Proving Remark 4 of Theorem 3
We will prove that for σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ, any
privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
will satisfy (9).
By symmetry, without loss of generality, we can assume
σ1 ≥ σ2. We will show that the left hand side of (9) is no
greater than σ1. Given r12 ≤ 1 − r11 and r21 ≤ 1 − r22, we
explain that the desired result follows once we show√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2(1− r11)(1− r22)
≤ σ1(2− r11)− σ2r22. (61)
To see (61) =⇒ (9), we note that given (61), the left hand side
of (9) is no greater than 12
[
σ1r11+σ2r22+σ1(2−r11)−σ2r22
]
≤ σ1 < 1/λ.
Note that the right hand side of (61) is non-negative from
σ1 ≥ σ2, r11 ≤ 1 and r22 ≤ 1. To prove (61), we have[
left hand side of (61)
]2 − [right hand side of (61)]2
= (σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2(1− r11)(1− r22)
− [σ1(2− r11)− σ2r22]2
= 4σ1σ1(r11 − 1)(σ1 − σ2) ≤ 0,
where the last step uses r11 ≤ 1 and the assumption σ1 ≥
σ2. Hence, (61) is proved so that the left hand side of (9) is
no greater than 2σ1 and further strictly less than 2/λ under
σ1 < 1/λ. This means that if σ1 < 1/λ and σ2 < 1/λ, then
(9) holds for any privacy scheme
[
r11 r12 1− r11 − r12
r21 r22 1− r21 − r22
]
.
Hence, given Theorem 3, we have proved Remark 4.
B. Establishing Theorem 3
We discuss the following three cases, respectively: i)
r11r22 = r12r21, ii) r11r22 > r12r21, and iii) r11r22 < r12r21.
The analysis below is for an equilibrium.
In Case i) of r11r22 = r12r21, we have shown in (21) that
P 1 =
σ1r21
σ2r22
P 2. In Case ii) or Case iii) below, given r11r22 6=
r12r21, (19) and (20) yield
SAP 1 = a1P 1 + b1P 2 for
a1
def
= σ2r22σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21) and
b1
def
= −σ1r21σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21) ,
(62)
and
SAP 2 = a2P 1 + b2P 2 for
a2
def
= −σ2r12σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21) and
b2
def
= σ1r11σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21) .
(63)
Case ii): We consider r11r22 > r12r21 here. If there exist
scalars t and c satisfying
a1 + ta2 = c (64)
and
b1 + tb2 = ct, (65)
then (62) (63) (64) and (65) together induce
SA(P 1 + tP 2) = c(P 1 + tP 2). (66)
From (64) and (65), c and t are determined from
t =
c− a1
a2
(67)
and
c2 − (a1 + b2)c+ a1b2 − a2b1 = 0. (68)
Using the expressions of a1, a2, b1, b2 from (62) and (63), we
write (68) as c2−µ1c+ν1 = 0, where µ1 def= σ1r11+σ2r22σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21)
and ν1
def
= 1σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21) . Under r11r22 > r12r21 and the
condition that r11, r12, r21, r22 are positive, we have µ1 > 0,
ν1 > 0, and µ12−4ν1 = (σ1r11−σ2r22)
2+4σ1σ2r12r21
[σ1σ2(r11r22−r12r21)]2 > 0. Then
there are two positive solutions c1 < c2 to (68). From (67), we
define t1
def
= b1c1−b2 and t2
def
= b1c2−b2 so it follows from (66) that
SA(P 1 + t1P 2) = c1(P 1 + t1P 2) and SA(P 1 + t2P 2) =
c2(P 1+ t2P 2). From Lemma 3, except the largest eigenvalue
of SA, no other eigenvalue of SA has a positive eigenvector.
Then at least one of the following cases occur:
• P 1 + t1P 2 equals 0,
• P 1 + t2P 2 equals 0,
• P 1 + t1P 2 equals some constant times of P 1 + t2P 2.
In any case, P 1 equals some constant times of P 2.
Case iii): We consider r11r22 < r12r21 here. If there exist
scalars t and c satisfying
a1 + ta2 = ct (69)
and
b1 + tb2 = c, (70)
then (62) (63) (69) and (70) together induce
SA(P 1 + tP 2) = c(P 1 + tP 2). (71)
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From (69) and (70), c and t are determined from
t =
c− b1
b2
(72)
and
c2 − (a2 + b1)c+ a2b1 − a1b2 = 0. (73)
Using the expressions of a1, a2, b1, b2 from (62) and (63), we
write (73) as c2−µ2c+ν2 = 0, where µ2 def= σ1r21+σ2r12σ1σ2(r12r21−r11r22)
and ν2
def
= 1σ1σ2(r12r21−r11r22) . Under r11r22 < r12r21 and the
condition that r11, r12, r21, r22 are positive, we have µ2 > 0,
ν2 > 0, and µ22−4ν2 = (σ1r21−σ2r12)
2+4σ1σ2r11r22
[σ1σ2(r12r21−r11r22)]2 > 0. Then
there are two positive solutions c1 < c2 to (73). From (72), we
define t1
def
= c1−b1b2 and t2
def
= c2−b1b2 so it follows from (71) that
SA(P 1 + t1P 2) = c1(P 1 + t1P 2) and SA(P 1 + t2P 2) =
c2(P 1+ t2P 2). From Lemma 3, except the largest eigenvalue
of SA, no other eigenvalue of SA has a positive eigenvector.
Then at least one of the following cases occur:
• P 1 + t1P 2 equals 0,
• P 1 + t2P 2 equals 0,
• P 1 + t1P 2 equals some constant times of P 1 + t2P 2.
In any case, P 1 equals some constant times of P 2.
Summarizing cases i) and ii), we can define some h such
that P 1 = hP 2. Then (13) and (14) imply
P 1 = σ1SA(r11h+ r21)P 2 (74)
and
P 2 = σ2SA(r12h+ r22)P 2. (75)
From Lemma 3, except the largest eigenvalue of SA, no other
eigenvalue of SA has a positive eigenvector. This along with
(74) and (75) implies
h =
σ1
σ2
· r11h+ r21
r12h+ r22
,
which reduces to
σ2r12h
2 + (σ2r22 − σ1r11)h− σ1r21 = 0. (76)
The quadratic equation (76) has a positive solution and a
negative solution, so h equals the positive solution; i.e.,
h =
σ1r11 − σ2r22 +
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
2σ2r12
.
(77)
With Q denoting P 1 + P 2, (75) and P 1 = hP 2 imply
Q = σ2(r12h+ r22)SAQ. (78)
Similar to the analysis after Equation (23), from (78), it is
useful to look at a traditional privacy-oblivious SIS diffusion
problem (not our privacy-aware SI1I2S competitive diffusion
problem, yet still on the network with adjacency matrix A)
with infection rate β∗ and healing rate δ∗ satisfying
β∗/δ∗ = σ2(r12h+ r22). (79)
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with qi denoting the probability of node i
being infected in the above SIS diffusion problem, it is well-
known that the dynamical system characterizing SIS diffusion
is given by
dqi
dt
= −δ∗qi + β∗(1− qi)
n∑
j=1
(aijqj). (80)
Below we explain (80) for the above SIS diffusion problem.
For each user i, another user j contributes to i’s infection
with a rate of β∗aijqj , where aij is multiplied so that the
contribution is non-zero only if j is i’s neighbor in the
network, and β∗ is multiplied since it is the infection rate.
Then we take a summation for j from 1 to n and have
β∗
∑n
j=1(aijqj) (note that aij = 1 for neighboring nodes
i and j, aij = 0 for non-neighboring nodes i and j, and
also aii = 0 so this summation essentially considers only i’s
neighbors). We further multiply this summation with 1 − qi
(the probability that node i is susceptible) to obtain the rate
that contributes to the increase of qi over time. On the other
hand, since the healing rate is δ∗, we multiply δ∗ with qi
to obtain the rate that contributes to the decrease of qi over
time. Given these, we obtain that dqid t is the result of the rate
β∗(1−qi)
∑n
j=1(aijqj) minus the rate δ∗qi; i.e., we have (80)
above.
In the above SIS problem, at an equilibrium, (79) (80) and
dqi
d t = 0 together imply
qi = (σ1r11 + σ2r22)(1− qi)
n∑
j=1
(aijqj). (81)
We recall (78), where Q is a column vector with elements
pi,1+pi,2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and S is a diagonal matrix with
elements 1 − (pi,1 + pi,2) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This and (81)
together mean that pi,1 + pi,2 can be understood as qi in (81)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n so that Q is an equilibrium of the above
SIS problem.
As shown in prior work [15]–[17], with λ denoting the
largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A, if
β∗/δ∗ < 1/λ, (82)
the only equilibrium for the above SIS problem is Q = 0,
which implies P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0 from Q = P 1 +P 2 and
P 1 = hP 2. Since (77), (79), and (82) together induce
1
2
[
σ1r11 + σ2r22
+
√
(σ1r11 − σ2r22)2 + 4σ1σ2r12r21
]
< λ−1, (83)
we obtain that under (83), the only equilibrium for our SI1I2S
problem is P 1 = 0 and P 2 = 0. 
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